Phishing Initial Access
Detect and investigate phishing as an initial access vector in enterprise environments.
Last updated: February 2026Purpose and Scope
Phishing remains the most common initial access technique used by attackers. This playbook covers detecting phishing delivery, analyzing payloads, and investigating compromises that begin with a malicious email or message.
Prerequisites
- Email telemetry: Mail gateway logs, Microsoft 365 message trace, Google Workspace email logs
- Endpoint telemetry: EDR with process creation, file writes, and network connections
- SIEM integration: Email and endpoint logs correlated in your analysis platform
- Threat intelligence: Access to IOC feeds and URL/file reputation services
Detection Goals
Identify and respond to:
- Malicious email delivery bypassing gateway filters
- User interaction with phishing links or attachments
- Credential theft on fake login pages
- Payload execution following phishing
- Lateral movement after initial compromise
Key Data Sources
Email Gateway and Provider Logs
- Microsoft 365: Message trace, Safe Links, Safe Attachments verdicts
- Google Workspace: Gmail logs in BigQuery or SIEM export
- Secure email gateways: Proofpoint, Mimecast, Barracuda logs
Key fields: sender, recipient, subject, URLs in body, attachment names, attachment hashes, delivery action, verdict.
Endpoint Telemetry
Correlate email events with endpoint activity:
- Outlook or browser spawning child processes
- File writes from email attachments
- Network connections initiated after email arrival
Investigation Workflow
1. Identify the Phishing Email
- Locate the email in gateway logs using sender, subject, or attachment hash
- Identify all recipients who received the same message
- Check delivery status: was it quarantined, delivered, or clicked?
- Extract indicators: sender domain, reply to address, URLs, attachment hashes
2. Analyze Indicators
- Check URLs against VirusTotal, urlscan.io, and internal blocklists
- Submit attachments to sandbox analysis
- Look up sender domain age, reputation, and SPF/DKIM/DMARC results
- Check if the sender domain is a typosquat of a known brand
3. Determine User Interaction
For each recipient, determine if they:
- Opened the email (if tracking available)
- Clicked links (Safe Links logs, web proxy, endpoint browser history)
- Opened attachments (endpoint file access logs)
- Entered credentials (check for subsequent anomalous logins)
- Executed payloads (endpoint process creation)
4. Check for Post-Compromise Activity
If users interacted with the phishing content:
- Review authentication logs for the affected accounts
- Look for mailbox rule changes (forwarding, deletion rules)
- Check for OAuth application consent grants
- Examine endpoint for persistence mechanisms
- Search for lateral movement to other systems
5. Scope the Incident
- How many users received the email?
- How many interacted with it?
- How many show signs of compromise?
- Are other systems affected?
Common Phishing Patterns
Credential Phishing
Fake login pages for Microsoft 365, Google, banking, or internal applications. Look for:
- Links to lookalike domains
- Redirects through legitimate services (Google Docs, Azure Blob)
- QR codes leading to phishing pages
Attachment Based Payloads
- Office documents with macros
- HTML attachments with embedded JavaScript
- ISO/IMG files containing executables
- Password protected archives
Business Email Compromise (BEC)
No malware, but social engineering to redirect payments or steal data:
- Impersonation of executives or vendors
- Requests to change payment details
- Urgency and secrecy themes
Response Actions
- Quarantine: Remove the email from all recipient mailboxes
- Block indicators: Add sender, URLs, and hashes to blocklists
- Reset credentials: For users who entered credentials on phishing pages
- Revoke sessions: Force reauthentication for compromised accounts
- Notify users: Alert recipients who did not interact yet
- Hunt for related activity: Search for other emails from the same campaign
Tuning and False Positives
- Legitimate marketing emails may trigger link click alerts
- Internal phishing simulations should be excluded from escalation
- Automated email forwarding can make attribution difficult
- Build allowlists for known safe senders and domains
References
- MITRE ATT&CK Phishing: attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566
- CISA Phishing Guidance: cisa.gov/phishing
- Microsoft 365 Message Trace: Microsoft documentation
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